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FAIR COMPENSATION AND THE
BOOMTOWN PROBLEM
MICHAEL O'HARE*
DEBRA R. SANDERSON**
Rapid development of energy facilities in small communities im-
poses social costs on local populations while serving nation-wide inter-
ests. The social pathologies arising from construction of energy
facilities in rural locations have created an "energy boomtown prob-
lem" that has been widely recognized.' Both proposed and current
solutions to the problem include prevention of localized costs brought
about by better facility siting practices 2 and state or federal planning
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AND DEV., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., RAPID GROWTH FROM ENERGY
PROJECTS: IDEAS FOR STATE AND LOCAL ACTION (1976); Gilmore, Boomtowns May
Hinder Energy Resources Development, 191 SCIENCE 535(1976). See generally K. TOOLE,
THE RAPE OF THE GREAT PLAINS 80-125 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Industrial Development Information and Siting Act, WYO. STAT. §§ 35-
502.75-.94 (Supp. 1975); Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-370, 90 Stat. 1013 (1976) (amending 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1972)). Other sources
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assistance for localities.3 Other solutions seek to assist localities by
improving their ability to raise revenue through existing means; for
example, state enabling legislation might be changed to increase the
local share of sales tax revenue and ease local borrowing restrictions.4
Another class of solutions to the energy boomtown problem compen-
sates communities for the costs imposed on them by energy devel-
opment.5
In this Article, the general "boomtown problem" and current com-
pensation schemes are considered, and the appropriateness of subsidy
schemes is analyzed on theoretical grounds. This analysis suggests that
the effect of these subsidies as usually designed is to reward people
who are not in fact injured by the development, and miss many of
those who deserve aid. The misdirection is a result of carelessly
identifying a community with the people who live in it at a particular
time. An appropriate compensation plan requires that the affected
groups of people be more carefully described. While the discussion
that follows considers the problem specifically in the context of boom-
town compensation programs, the analytical approach can be general-
ized to other geographically related programs.
I. THE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT BOOMTOWN PROBLEM
At first glance, the construction and operation of an energy extrac-
tion or conversion facility6 in a rural location does not suggest a need
for subsidies to the affected community. Economic development, of
which an energy facility provides a dose enormous both absolutely and
relatively, is something communities usually seek out and encourage.
Offsetting these expected and realized benefits from energy devel-
opment, however, are costs imposed on the localities that host either
the developments or the newcomers needed to support them. In fact, it
has been widely accepted that the rate of development in the "typical"
boomtown is so great, and the changes in the quality of life it brings are
so drastic, that accepted social indicators, such as employment stabili-
3. Gilmore, supra note 1.
4. Wyoming Legislative Select Committee on Industrial Development Impact, In-
terim Report and Recommendation (1974).
5. For examples, see notes 35-38 and accompanying text infra. For a rationale for
federal aid to boomtowns and their states, see J. Monaghan, Managing the Impacts of
Energy Development: A Policy Analysis from a State Government Perspective (April
1977) (address delivered at National Governor's Conference, Washington, D.C.).
6. These facilities include strip-mines, coal-fired electricity generating facilities, coal
gasification plants and oil drilling operations.
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ty, divorce rates, alcoholism and crime, are likely to record real
pathologies: life in the boomtown is worse than it was in the village that
preceded it.7 Field interviews in several western states and the litera-
ture on boomtowns reveal several types of problems.
I. Social Disruption. Sudden changes in the nature of a commu-
nity impose a new social structure on the old one and cause social
conflict. Rates of alcoholism, drug abuse, mental illness, divorce and
juvenile delinquency increase. 8 The Gillette, Wyoming divorce rate is
now twice that found in the surrounding county. 9 Children have low
achievement levels and increased truancy; assaults increase."0 Rock
Springs' Mental Health Center has had a ninefold increase in cases
when population approximately doubled between 1970 and 1975.11 The
Center reports that most of its new cases are long time residents having
difficulty managing drastic changes caused by the large population
influx.12 They are more likely than the newcomers to become alcoholic
or suffer from mental illness.13
2. Inadequacy of Public Services. Public services, especially
those constrained by the size and condition of capital goods, often
falter under the pressure of rapid population growth accompanying
energy development. Prior to the energy boom, facilities may have
been barely adequate-perhaps in poor condition or operating at ca-
pacity for a small population. A rapid influx of people requires service
expansion and improvement or the addition of previously non-existent
services, but few boomtown areas are forewarned about coming devel-
opments or the need to enhance their fiscal capacity. A variety of
examples can be found:
- Eight out of ten water wells in one oil boomtown go dry because
of increased water consumption;14
7. Little, Some Social Consequences of Boom Towns, 53 N.D. L. REV. 401 (1977);J.
GILMORE and M. DUFF, supra note 1; Gilmore, supra note 1.
8. Little, supra note 7.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. J. GILMORE and M. DUFF, supra note 1, at 12. But see Mountain West Research,
Inc., Construction Worker Profile: Final Report 55 (1975) (Prepared for the Old West
Regional Commission, Billings, Montana) (reporting only a 90% increase in cases).
12. Mountain West Research, Inc., supra note 11, at 55.
13. R. Foster, State Responses to the Adverse Impacts of Energy Development in
Wyoming (1977) (Energy Impacts Project, Laboratory of Architecture and Planning,
M.I.T.).
14. D. Sanderson, State Responses to the Adverse Impacts of Energy Development
in Texas 1-4 to 8 (1977) (Energy Impacts Project, Laboratory of Architecture and
Planning, M.I.T.).
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- Two Texas boomtowns discharge almost raw sewage because of
overloaded treatment plants;15
- A kindergarten meets in a condemned building because of a
shortage of space; 16
- County protective officers, facing increased county-wide de-
mands, reduce previous city coverage and force several small
towns to create municipal police forces;17
- A Texas coal boomtown must more than double its number of
firemen and almost double the amount of its firefighting equip-
ment and facilities in order to remove a State Insurance Board
penalty (based on the city's lowered firemen/population ratio)
and to provide expected services.18
3. Shortage of Private Goods and Services. During a boom, the
private market rarely keeps pace with the demand for goods and
services, especially housing. In some cases, housing shortages can res-
trict energy development: one hundred families recently found no
housing when transferred to an oil boomtown and had to be transferred
back to their previous positions. 9
4. Inflation. Excess demand triggers inflation in prices, wages
and rents. While price increases are welcomed by the storeowner
whose costs usually do not rise as quickly as revenues, and increased
housing prices are a blessing to the landlord, inflation is particularly
harmful to the senior citizen and others on fixed incomes who cannot
take advantage of rising wages. High construction wages, combined
with a general labor shortage, cause other wages to rise. This can hurt
the agricultural economy (though agricultural workers benefit from
higher wages if their employers don't go out of business).
Increased costs can also affect provision of local public services.
Two boomtowns2 had to increase salaries by 40% in order to hold
experienced employees. Increased costs for building materials raise
municipal costs just when public facilities need to be expanded. 21
5. Revenue Shortfalls. Even though growth expands sales and
property tax bases, revenues increase more slowly than costs in the
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. P. Burke, An Impact Evaluation Report, City of Mount Pleasant, Texas 30 (1976)
(General Land Office, Austin, Texas).
19. D. Sanderson, supra note 14, at 11-21.
20. Mt. Pleasant, Texas and Pearsall, Texas. Id. at II-10.
21. Id.
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short run. Despite a 19% increase in sales tax revenue, Mt. Pleasant,
Texas, a coal boomtown, has already increased property tax rates
several times.22 Even with a 68% increase in its local sales tax revenue,
Pearsall, Texas, an oil boomtown, finds itself short of operating
funds. 23 These revenue shortfalls are due to (i) delays between the time
development begins and the time the locality realizes either property or
sales tax revenue; (ii) delays in raising capital for constructing and
improving public facilities; (iii) capital needs beyond local govern-
ment's legal bonding capacity; (iv) location of high-tax-yielding proper-
ties outside the communities hosting the newcomers and the resulting
public costs.
6. Resources Lost to Other Uses. Industry and its workers are
notably consumptive of three resources needed by the agricultural
economy: water, land and labor. As new industries use efficient collec-
tion techniques and cities exercise eminent domain over water rights,
less is available for agriculture. In the energy development regions of
some states, groundwater use is unregulated by state permits.2 4 In-
creased consumption by energy development may mean water short-
ages for cities and agricultural producers drawing from the same
aquifer.
Easily irrigated land near stream beds is particularly valuable to
agriculture but it is also valuable to energy developers because, for
example, coal is nearer the surface.25 Strip-mining reduces agricultural
output by removing land from production for at least ten years. Food
processing industries fail in oil boomtowns because agricultural pro-
ducers face a shortage of inexpensive labor, created by high drilling
salaries that attract unskilled and semi-skilled farm workers. 26
22. Id. at 11-11.
23. Id. Hanna, Wyoming presents another example of inadequate tax base growth. In
the first three years of its boom, property assessed valuation rose 66%, but the per capita
tax base fell from $562.12 to $499.87. Its tax rate was already at the statutory maximum.
Outside subsidies were required to maintain adequate public services. Nellis, What Does
Energy Development Mean for Wyoming?, 33 HUMAN ORGANIZATON 229, 236 (1974).
24. For example, in Texas the voluntarily formed Water Conservation and Subsi-
dence Districts are the only entities with power to regulate the spacing and extraction
rates of water wells. Seldom do these special districts restrict water extraction. D.
Sanderson, supra note 14, at 111-7. Both Colorado and North Dakota face court tests of
the state's right to regulate groundwater use. C. Lu, State Responses to the Adverse
Impacts of Energy Development in North Dakota 16-18 (1977) (Energy Impacts Project,
Laboratory of Architecture and Planning, M.I.T.); L. Monaco, State Responses to the
Adverse Impacts of Energy Development in Colorado 33-34 (1977) (Energy Impacts
Project, Laboratory of Architecture and Planning, M.I.T.).
25. D. Sanderson, supra note 14 at 11-22 to 24; R. Foster, supra note 13, at 10.
26. One town which has experienced this is Dilly, Texas. D. Sanderson, supra note
14, at 11-22 to 24.
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7. Aesthetic Deterioration. Boomtown development sacrifices
amenity to economy and ease of construction. Trailer courts are laid
out without paving or landscaping. Commercial establishments are
built of sheet metal and often located in unsightly strips along major
roads. Many residents consider aesthetic deterioration a problem, par-
ticularly if they considered the area attractive before the boom. Part of
the aesthetic problem is caused by the size of new developments: many
new neighborhoods, in which trees and shrubs have not had a chance
to grow, look barren and dwarf established parts of town.
8. Fundamental Change. An important cost of boomtown devel-
opment has nothing to do with conventional indicators of stress or
inadequacy, since it results from change itself rather than what the
town changes to. The original residents of a boomtown chose their
community, or chose to remain, because it was the best place for them,
or at least the best they could afford. When development occurs, the
appearance, social structure, friendship patterns, style of life and
nearly everything else about their community changes. The com-
munity that supported them simply disappears. The injury such disap-
pearance causes is only partly mitigated if the "new" town is clean and
orderly; transporting an Eskimo to New York is only slightly less
stressful if he is taken to Park Avenue rather than Harlem.
A. The Rationale for Direct Assistance
Some boomtown costs can be prevented through better company or
community planning. An alternate facility site may destroy less farm
land; a new technology may require less water for processing coal; a
town with excess public facility capacity could absorb a population
increase without strain. But even the best planned and operated facility
will force costly changes upon the surrounding communities. Prevent-
ing these costs may be unavoidable, impractical, or too expensive, that
is, exceeding the cost of suffering. For example, the cost of preventing
social cost to oldtimers by building a whole new town for immigrants
would probably exceed the benefits obtained. In these cases tolerating
the costs rather than preventing them may be efficient.
Unfortunately, these costly changes often take place in energy
boomtowns without compensation. The resulting decrease in the quali-
ty of life suggests that citizens of the community are bearing an unfair
share of the costs of providing energy to ultimate consumers. "Costs"
in this sense may be monetary, as is the case when taxes increase
following construction of the facility, but they may take many other
[Vol. 14:101
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forms including damage to the natural environment, increases in the
crime rate, or a change in the community's social structure due to a
large influx of construction workers and their families. 27
It is important to note at this point that not all boomtown costs are
best reduced by compensation or subsidy. Some result from what an
economist would call market failure, and are, or should be, dealt with
by programs which involve no direct transfers of funds. For example,
the inability of developing communities to finance newly needed capit-
al facilities like sewage treatment plants or schools, or housing, often
results (i) from state limitations on local borrowing, and (ii) from
federal limits on lending interest rates. These limitations impede the
functioning of a free capital market. Without these constraints,
economic theory shows that towns or builders could borrow the right
amount of funds at an efficient interest rate (one which reflects the real
risks of the loan or bonds). If the market failure produced by these
constraints becomes more costly than other problems they present,
then the appropriate boomtown relief strategy is to relax them. 28
A wide variety of boomtown relief programs are fundamentally
concerned with correcting market failures. Typical of these are state
loans to local communities, planning services, bonding limit exten-
sions and better state planning. 29 Programs of this kind are separable,
both conceptually and in fact, from subsidies that transfer resources to
boomtowns or their residents, and the remainder of this Article will
have almost nothing to say about them. In general, we think anything a
government can do to make the market in energy development work
efficiently is probably a good idea, and programs of this kind are, if
anything, under-appreciated. In the discussion that follows, however,
our concern will be with programs that transfer money or services to
boomtowns.
27. The previous section of this Article highlights these costs imposed on boomtowns
and particularly their long time residents. See generally J. GILMORE and M. DUFF, supra
note 1; P. Burke, supra note 18; R. Foster, supra note 13; Gilmore, supra note 1; R.
Little, supra note 7; D. Sanderson, supra note 14.
28. Another example of market failure is the inability of boomtowns to obtain profes-
sional planning services. If the labor market in city planners worked perfectly, every
town could buy as much planning as it needed. Because planners are difficult to divide
among towns and often unwilling to move to rural places, it may be appropriate for the
state government to provide planning services to developing communities. If it charges
for the service, it will be operating a market-failure-correction scheme. If it gives away
the service, it will be running a subsidy program as well.
29. For an overview of typical relief programs, see OFFICE OF COMMUNITY PLANNING
AND DEV., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., RAPID GROWTH FROM ENERGY
PROJECTS: IDEAS FOR STATE AND LOCAL ACTION 30-34 (1976).
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Assuming that boomtown development is made as efficient and
equitable as possible by introduction of programs to correct market
failures, what theoretical basis underlies transfer programs? The deci-
sion to mine coal or convert it into electricity involves a comparison of
the costs involved (bulldozers, labor, insurance, land acquisition, etc.)
with the benefits (sales, for the most part). If some of the costs are
ignored, too much coal will be mined or burned-it will appear "cheap-
er" than it really is. Thus efficiency requires that decisionmakers
consider the costs of their energy development including the cost of
inputs like small-town amenity which they consume in the production
process. 30 The obvious way to ensure that these costs are considered is
to make energy developers pay for them, and then pass them on to
consumers in the form of higher prices.
However, efficiency does not always require that the sufferers be
paid.31 Rather, in most cases, payment may be justified by the equity
principle that people should be compensated when they suffer private
loss for the public gain. 32 Our collective desire for coal does not justify
confiscation of the amenity of a small-town inhabitant. In summary,
since the energy development is providing economic and other bene-
fits, such as furthering energy independence, on a national or at least
statewide scale, and since the price energy consumers pay should
reflect all the costs of production, equity and efficiency suggest that
the beneficiaries of the development compensate the losers (the com-
munity) for their associated costs.
30. One calculation finds social costs about one and one-half times the amount of
direct costs in the production of electricity from coal. See E. Peelle, Internalizing Social
Costs in Power Plant Siting: Some Examples for Coal and Nuclear Plants in the United
States 1 (November 17, 1976) (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, paper presented at the
International Meeting of the American Nuclear Society, Washington, D.C.).
31. The analysis of problems of this kind is the task of externality theory in welfare
economics. Whether sufferers from an externality (an economic effect external to a
decision-maker's balance sheet) should be compensated for efficiency's sake is not
generally a simple matter. For a thorough discussion, see W. BAUMOL AND W. OATES,
THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1975). For a less technical introduction, see R.
DORFMAN AND N. DORFMAN, ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT (1972).
32. In law, where government action is involved, the problem is addressed in discus-
sions of the "taking issue." Principal papers on the legal issues involved include F.
BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES and J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973); Costonis, "Fair"
Compensation and Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land
Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975); Michelman, Property, Utility and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings, Private Property, and Public Rights, 81 YALE
L. J. 149 (1971). These articles concentrate on questions of land use but deal also with
the larger issues.
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B. Existing Boomtown Programs
To put present compensation schemes in context, important flows of
funds, some of which are zero under present policy, are displayed in
Figure 1. In this diagram, resources from the different, but not exclu-
sive population groups are transferred through the developers and the
different government units to various recipients. Each population pays
taxes (Tn, T, Td to its appropriate level of government. Federal and
state governments spend some of these dollars and transfer a portion
to lower levels of government (Af1 , As, Afc). These transfer payments
are designed to increase the recipient's ability to provide certain goods
and services deemed important by the giver. The governments also
receive revenue from energy developers (Tdf, Tds, Td) who buy labor
with wages (W) and receive revenue through sales to the national
population (S).
Local communities usually shoulder much of the responsibility for
providing public services. In cases of normal population growth, local
communities can provide these services since their revenues (Tdc, T.,
A,, Af) expand at approximately the same rate as expenses. How-
ever, in cases of rapid energy development, service needs expand
much faster than the local revenues. When energy facilities are outside
a community's boundary it receives no direct benefits at all from the
development (Tdc=O). Community tax revenues (Td generally lag
population growth.
Every existing compensation program can be described as changing
the amount of funds flowing along one of the arrows of this diagram.
Where state and federal governments feel responsible to assist lo-
calities, they may tax their populations or developers to finance com-
pensation to communities.33
Several programs have been developed at the local, state and federal
levels to adjust the total of costs and benefits for energy boomtowns to
zero or above. These programs vary in several ways, but they can be
conveniently sorted out according to the source of their funds.
33. One important justification for government impact programs was suggested previ-
ously in our discussion of the rationale for direct assistance. That is, since the larger
polity benefits from the development, it should share in the induced costs. Additionally,
a government might justify these programs on the theory that, since its policies either
directly or indirectly cause these costs, it should therefore "pay" for them, or because
the payments may induce local support for regionally beneficial but locally noxious
projects.
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Figure 1
Compensation Types
Community
Population
State
Federal
Government
State
Community
Government
National Population
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KEY: Figure 1
T. = Federal government revenues from income tax, mineral lease revenues
T = State government revenues from sales taxes, property taxes, mineral lease reve-
nues, possibly income taxes
T, = Community government revenues from sales taxes, property taxes, user fees
S = Developers' sales of energy resources to consumers nation-wide
Tdf = Federal taxes and payments required of developers
Td, = State taxes and payments required of developers, such as severance taxes,
conversion taxes, corporate income taxes, permit fees
T& = Community taxes and payments required of developers, such as property taxes,
building permit fees, sales taxes
Af, = Federal transfer payments to states
A, = State transfer payments to local communities
Af, = Federal transfer payments directly to local communities
W = Developer's costs of doing business (including wages, capital costs, and land
costs) exclusive of payments to governments.
1. The community government may use its authority to require the
developer to make payments equalling the development's net cost to
the community (Tdc=Costs).34 Most local governments lack sufficient
34. In Washington, the Skagit County Commissioners conditioned site zoning ap-
proval on a contract rezone agreement under which Puget Power and Light Co. must
meet 35 conditions to "reasonably and adequately mitigate the impacts of the construc-
tion of the project on the community." E. Peelle, supra note 30, at 11-18. Tax prepay-
ments are calculated to cover education and law enforcement costs. Id. See Myhra,
Energy Development, in PRACTICING PLANNER 12 (Sept. 1976). Because of their limited
control over developments, few community governments are capable of directly de-
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authority, either de lege or de facto, to effectively implement such a
policy.
2. The state government can transfer revenue from both the state
population (T) and from the developer (Tds) to the community govern-
ment (AJ ). Ts includes income, sales and property taxes, while (Tdj
comprises severance taxes, conversion taxes and permit fees. Commu-
nity payments (Asc) can be channeled through grants, loans or state
provision of services.35
3. With similar mechanisms, the federal government may transfer
revenue from the national population (Tn) and from developers (Tdf) to
the community government (Aj). 36
manding payments equal to the costs they absorb. Most taxing schemes must be imposed
equally on all residents and not just on developers. More important, a single commu-
nity's competitive position vis-a-vis a major energy company is weak. If it demands
much more in local aid than the government of an alternate site, the developer may
simply go elsewhere. For one view of developer-community relations, see S. West,
Opportunities for Company-Community Cooperation in Mitigating Energy Facility Im-
pacts (1977) (Energy Impacts Project, Laboratory of Architecture and Planning, M.I.T.).
35. For example, Wyoming has imposed a special coal severance tax to create a fund
from which communities affected by coal production may obtain grants or loans to
finance public water, sewer, highway, road or street projects. The tax will expire when
$120 million has been collected for the fund. Wyo. STAT. §§ 39-227.1, .10 (Supp. 1975 &
Supp. 1977). Other compensation programs are authorized by the Wyoming Joint Powers
Act, Wyo. STAT. §§ 9-18.13 to .20 (Supp. 1975), and the Wyoming Community Devel-
opment Authority Act, Wyo. STAT. 88 9-826 to 848 (Supp. 1975). See R. Foster, supra
note 13, at 20-25.
North Dakota has imposed a privilege tax on coal conversion facilities. A percentage
of the tax is returned to the county in which the facility is located. N.D. CENT. CODE §§
57-60-01 to 96 (Supp. 1977). North Dakota has also imposed a coal severence tax, with
the proceeds allocated to coal impacted communities. N.D. CENr. CODE §§ 57-61-01 to
10, 57-62-01 to 05 (Supp. 1977). See C. Lu, supra note 24, at 24-30. Both the Wyoming
and North Dakota programs are designed to compensate communities for the adverse
fiscal impacts imposed by energy developments. They do not attempt to compensate for
all local energy development costs. Their programs focus on front-end capital require-
ments and link impact payments with revenues gained from increased energy devel-
opment.
36. Only one federal compensation program provides aid directly to localities (Ard
without going through state decision-making bodies. Under the Payments to Local
Governments for Entitlement Lands Act, 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1607 (Supp. 1977), the
federal government pays to any unit of local government up to 75 cents per acre of
"entitlement lands" located in that unit's boundaries. Id. § 1602(a). If the land is located
in two jurisdictions, e.g., a town and a county, the smaller jurisdiction receives the
payment. Id. § 1602(d). The payment is reduced according to the amount of other
revenues collected from the federal property. Id. § 1602(a)(1). The objective of this
payment is to compensate localities for foregone tax revenue. The only restriction on
funds which go directly to localities is that they be used for a governmental purpose. Id.
§ 1601. Payments are "made whether or not the lands are leased. See S. Brody, Federal
Aid to Energy Impacted Communities: A Review of Related Programs and Legislative
Proposals 40-44 (1977) (Energy Impacts Project, Laboratory of Architecture and Plan-
ning, M.I.T.).
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4. Another approach involves federal and state cooperation. In-
stead of directly compensating the community government, the federal
government may transfer revenue to the state government (Afs), with
the expectation that the state will transfer all or a portion of the aid to
the appropriate locality (AJ).37 Federal controls over the state's alloca-
tion range from federally-established distribution formulae to federally
recommended but non-binding priorities for the revenues' use.
5. Federal and state governments can use their authority, on behalf
of the community government, to require developers to compensate
communities directly (Td). 38
37. Through the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1971), as amended
by 30 U.S.C.A. 33 181-287 (Supp. 1977), 50% of the revenue from federally-owned
mineral leases is returned to the states in which the leased land is located. Id. § 191.
Under the Act as amended, the state legislature has the responsibility of directing use of
this revenue for planning, public facilities and public services giving priority to those
subdivisions of the state socially or economically affected by mineral development. Id.
Communities receive only a portion of the revenue collected originally from mineral
leases within their boundaries. For example, Wyoming gives some directly to host
counties and places bonuses in an "impact and emergency account." Wyo. STAT. §§ 9-
577 to 580.1 (Supp. 1975). See R. Foster, supra note 13, at 34-36. Colorado places its
revenue in an Oil Shale Trust Fund, the interest from which is distributed to affected
communities. COLO. Rav. STAT. § 34-63-104 (Supp. 1976). See L. Monaco, supra note
24, at 37-38.
Another example, the Coastal Energy Impact Program (CEIP), requires that all of the
money eventually pass through to the affected communities. The Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-370, 90 Stat. 1013 (1976) (amending 16
U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1972)), allocate $1.2 billion for grants and loans to states and local
areas affected by coastal energy development. It determines the interstate distribution of
the funds and places restrictions and requirements on each state's intrastate allocation.
Local areas must be able to demonstrate that they have exhausted other forms of
assistance before applying for CEIP grants. See S. Brody, supra note 36, at 27-33.
38. For example, the Wyoming Industrial Siting Council requires developers to assist
communities in providing public services should public revenues fall short of the de-
mands placed on them by the energy development. Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-502.75 to .94
(Supp. 1975). In this situation the state uses its legal authority to force developers to
provide local benefits (TdC) which localities could not negotiate on their own. See R.
Foster, supra note 13, at 30-34. In one instance, the Wyoming Industrial Siting Council
conditioned the license for Missouri Basin Electric's proposed Wheatland power plant
on the provision of financial assistance designed to reduce impacts. Direct payments and
technical assistance help provide many public and private services, totaling approxi-
mately $19.3 million. (Up to $15 million may be recoverable through sale of the housing
project). E. Peelle, supra note 30, at 9-18.
There are several other relevant examples. The defeated Synthetic Fuels Bill (H.R.
12112) would have permitted the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administra-
tion (ERDA) to require a development company to compensate community costs im-
posed by a federal demonstration project. Proposed Amendments to the FederalNonnuc-
lear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974: Hearings on H.R. 12112 Before the
Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and
Housing, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-40 (1976). See S. Brody, supra note 36, at 34-36. The
Federal Power Commission has assumed authority to force developers to mitigate
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Several criteria can be applied to programs of this kind. They ask
whether the program is (i) transferring the right amount of funds (ii)
from the right source (iii) to the right recipients. Criteria of the first
type comprise an extensive literature on cost-benefit analysis. 39 The
difficulty of knowing how much compensation to pay rests for the
most part in assessing prices for goods, such as aesthetic quality or
family stablity, which are not conventionally traded in markets and for
which money prices cannot be observed. We will not consider this
problem here as boomtowns do not present special difficulties in cost-
benefit assessment.
Whether the right people are paying for boomtown compensation
(the right people are prima facie, but rebuttably in special cases,
energy consumers) is a question of applied economics. Again, although
technically challenging, this problem is not peculiar to boomtowns and
we will examine it no further.
The remainder of the Article will, however, consider what kind of
program is likely to reach the right recipients-the people who are
made worse off by the development of a boomtown. We will see that
giving money to a boomtown government, as nearly all existing and
proposed programs do, is unlikely to reward the proper individuals.
Even giving the town facilities, as a developer might do under pro-
grams of type 5 above,40 misdirects the subsidy. To see why this is the
case, we must look at the boomtown's population, and the dynamics of
its development, in detail.
C. Boomtown Dynamics
In order to design programs that reach the right recipients, the static
model of boomtowns (Figure 1) must be replaced with a dynamic one
(Figure 2) that depicts in more detail the changing characteristics of
boomtowns. Figure 2 disaggregates the decisions made through a
boomtown's history, and the impacts these decisions have, over six
populations and over time. The six populations include:
adverse impacts imposed upon host communities. See E. Peelle, supra note 30, at 5. The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission has required TVA to make direct payments to com-
munities affected by the proposed Hartsville Nuclear Power Plant. Id. at 11.
39. The word "extensive" is to be emphasized. Introductions to the field can be
found in E. MISHAN, ECONOMICS FOR SOCIAL DECISIONS (1973); E. STOKEY and R.
ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR PUBLIC CHOICE (1977).
40. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
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i. The energy facility developer and its shareholders,
ii. The community residents who remain through the devel-
opment process,
iii. The immigrants who arrive as development proceeds,
iv. The outmigrants (those members of the community whose
decision to leave is related to the development),
v. The population of the state, and
vi. The population of the nation.
These six categories of people are subpopulations of the three major
populations listed previously.41 The categories are not necessarily ex-
clusive nor do their memberships necessarily coincide with a single
government's constituents. At different times people may be found in
more than one category.
The circles in Figure 2 are decision symbols, and vary in size to
illustrate the power the respective decision-makers have in the choices
taken at each stage. 42 The triangles indicate the groups affected by the
decisions at each stage, and vary in size according to the "per capita"
importance of the impact. 43 Figure 2 can be read as a narrative from
top to bottom. Initially the state and national populations determine
their respective energy policies within which future development must
occur. In the next stage, the energy company, with a varying amount
of state and national participation, chooses a location. Next the entire
initial population of the community, including both those who will
remain through the development process and those who will leave (i)
construct a set of local restrictions within which development can
occur, and (ii) do the initial planning which will guide the community's
response to the changes brought by development. The company makes
a "go/no-go" decision which presumably involves a prediction of the
profitability of the development under the restrictions developed in the
previous stage. Members of a potential immigrant population decide
whether to move to the community. When the development stage
comes to an end and the operation of the facility enters a steady state,
the remaining original residents and the immigrants (the new perma-
41. See Figure 1 supra.
42. For example, on the assumption that immigrants substantially outnumber the
remaining original residents of the community, they are expected to be more powerful in
making local government policy in the post-development phase. Similarly, national
energy policy dominates state policy for reasons of budget and constitutional prece-
dence.
43. We use the term "per capita" somewhat loosely, to indicate the relative change in
the utility of a member of a particular population. Notice that the size of this symbol
does not vary with the size of the population.
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nent population of the community) determine local government
policies with regard to public services, tax levels and the other normal
business of government."M
"Impact triangles" without "decision circles" are significant since,
wherever possible, decisions should be made by those affected by
them.45 A look at Figure 2 in this light brings the problem of the
boomtown into perspective; every triangle not associated with a circle
promises dissatisfaction for the affected population unless two things
are simultaneously true:
1. The population empowered with the decision desires to act in
the interest of the affected population, and,
2. The population empowered with the decision is informed as to
the desires of the affected population.
For example, the choice of a site is usually made predominantly by the
developer. The consequences of choosing one site over another, as-
suming a spectrum of reasonably comparable sites, will probably be
fairly small in the company's terms, but for a particular community the
consequences of being chosen will be enormous. We can expect that a
bad decision is likely to occur if the developer is ignorant of the desires
of the community. The next stage of decision, local planning, shows
five populations affected by a decision taken by only two of them, but
the decision-making populations have a great deal at stake. In this case
it is likely not only that they will misunderstand or ignore the desires of
the other two, but that the deciders' and the sufferers' interests will
actually diverge; both conditions for a "correct" choice will be ab-
sent.46
44. An important source of boomtown problems is often a mismatch between the
governments with taxing or regulatory authority over development and the populations
affected. A common example is a facility located in a school district different from the
one in which its employees reside; the plant's district has enormous potential tax
revenues but few school children while the residents' district has large educational
obligations but a small tax base. UNITED STATES ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
ADMINISTRATION, MANAGING THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF ENERGY DEvEL-
OPMENT (1976). Our narrative decision model does not display this mismatch for reasons
of clarity, but the reader should recognize the likelihood that consequences of devel-
opment are not compartmentalized geographically to follow local government bound-
aries,
45. We violate this principle willingly only when we are forced to by practical
considerations, as when a population voluntarily relinquishes its decision-making power
in a repetitious or highly technical matter to an administrative unit of government.
46. Real examples of such mismatches are easy to find. In fact, the existing structure
of most state compensation programs invites dissatisfaction of the affected population
since the state officials, who serve the statewide population, decide on impact payments
to the local, affected population, and the interests of the state government can conflict
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At this point it may be useful to review the sources of the "boom-
town problem" in light of the foregoing analysis. The process
threatens a suboptimal outcome in any of several places. Notice that 3,
4 and 6 below are evident only in light of a dynamic rather than a static
analysis.
1. National and state energy policy, which is presumably design-
ed to serve an aggregate of the interests of the whole popula-
tion, may be set with insufficient sensitivity to the large per
capita costs imposed upon specific small groups which have
little voting power. Despite the best will in the world on the
part of the governmental decision-makers, such costs may
occur for purely structural reasons. Notice that until specific
sites are chosen for energy facilities, the citizens of many
small rural communities respectively face only a small proba-
bility of being selected, so even if one wished to be respon-
sive, it would be impossible to identify the particular towns
whose population will in the end be affected.
Even recognizing local costs, a Kaldor-Hicks criterion47 will
probably be used in a particular siting choice. Under this
criterion a "correct" choice would accept the imposition of
local costs if the (nationally distributed) benefits outweighed
them. Most analysts believe this rule to be justified even
though the sufferers are not compensated out of the gainers'
benefits.
2. The next chance for costly error lies in the selection of sites.
A developer may well be insensitive to differences in the
desire for development of the communities among which it is
choosing.
3. After a site has been selected, planning for future services
must inevitably be conducted without the participation of
with the best interest of local energy impacted communities. Local officials cite this
conflict as a reason to restructure compensation programs. For example, energy boom-
town officials and developers in North Dakota argue that Coal Impact Funds should be
given directly to boomtowns, since they know their needs better than any state agency.
See C. Lu, supra note 24 at 28-30. They also argue that a larger portion of the Coal
Severance Tax and the Coal Conversion Tax revenues should go to affected com-
munities, since current compensation does not cover their costs. See The Beulah Beacon
(Beulah, N.D.), September 23, 1976, at 1, col. 4. However, state officials prefer dis-
tributing benefits among all state residents rather than just compensating boomtowns.
See C. Lu, supra note 24, at 28-30.
47. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion favors a change in the current societal state if those
benefiting could compensate those losing in such a way that some would be better off
and none worse off, even if the compensation would not actually occur. The underlying
assumption is that, in the long run, the total net benefits of a series of choices will be
equally dispersed across the total population. See generally E. STOKEY and R. ZEc-
KHAUSER, supra note 39; Zeckhauser and Schaefer, Public Policy and Normative
Economic Theory, in THE STUDY OF POLICY FORMATION (R. Bauer & K. Gergen, eds.)
58-60 (1968).
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future immigrants, even though they are the people who, by
sheer number, will suffer the lion's share of the conse-
quences. The immigrants not only have no political voice in
the process at this point but cannot even be identified.
4. The consequences of the planning process for the portion of
original residents who have the characteristics of being mobile
and are thus potential outmigrants is especially interesting. 48 If
the restrictions the community places on the development are
so onerous that the company chooses not to proceed with the
projects, this portion of original residents has a future essen-
tially unchanged from their present condition and won't be
driven to relocate. On the other hand, if the development
proceeds and they decide to relocate, the success or failure of
the planning restrictions they help to generate will be of no
consequence to them.49
5. Some projects ought not to go forward, even by the Kaldor-
Hicks test, but if the developer makes the decisions, these
projects may be carried out in spite of the large social costs
they impose on the community residents.
6. Finally, there is reason to believe that the large number of
immigrants to an energy boomtown may have markedly dif-
ferent tastes in government services, taxing policy and social
conventions from the original rural population. Age differ-
ences, particularly between the retired farmers and ranchers
living in small town centers and young construction workers,
or contrasts in occupations and lifestyles can combine with
the preponderant voting power of the immigrants to produce
dissatisfaction with local policies among oldtimerslu
48. See generally S. GOLDSTEIN, PATTERNS OF MOBILITY, 1910-1950, THE NORRIS-
TOWN STUDY (1958); I. LOWRY, MIGRATION & METROPOLITAN GROWTH: Two ANALYTICAL
MODELS (1966).
49. A cynic would predict latent outmigrants to (i) favor proposals only if they
diminished the likelihood of construction and (ii) have no interest in proposals which
would actually improve the local quality of life if the development proceeded. Their
utility structure in any case is distinctly at variance with the interests of residents who
expect to remain through the project's future history. However, until the day they leave,
their formal political position is indistinguishable from that of the residents destined to
remain. The local political scene in this critical phase is further confused because all
residents may find it strategic to pretend to be "conditional outmigrants." The "real"
outmigrants may be hard to distinguish from the remainers, and some people may not
even know their own status.
50. Young boomtown immigrants in Hanna, Wyoming, show a preference for more
public services than do oldtimers of all ages. In the 30-years-and-under age group,
newcomers show stronger preferences for retail shopping facilities, good schools, sani-
tary facilities, youth organizations, civic-service groups, and recreational facilities. In
the over-30 age groups, newcomers and oldtimers have more similar preferences. New-
comers and oldtimers also differ politically. While oldtimers in Hanna are staunch Labor
Democrats, newcomers are more likely to be Independents. For more differences in
these two groups, see Nellis, supra note 23; Mountain West Research, Inc., supra note
11, at 126.
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The suboptimality of much boomtown development, especially that
resulting from causes 1, 2, 4 and 6 above, takes the form of unneces-
sary or unfair costs which are imposed on particular groups of people.
In the next section we will consider the problem of identifying such
groups and the costs they suffer.
II. IDENTIFYING COMPENSABLE COSTS
There are several reasons why governments may institute subsidy
programs in *addition to compensating suffering caused by devel-
opment or other government actions. In fact, most transfer programs
are directed to recipients who are thought worthy because of their
condition rather than because of the reasons for it. Income equaliza-
tion programs and other forms of welfare subsidize people who are
poor, ill-housed or ill-fed. Fortunately, all such criteria are irrelevant
to our discussion. Whatever subsidies are thought wise by society for
the poor or otherwise deprived, a different set of decisions should
determine compensation programs for costs caused by boomtown de-
velopment. In other words, we are assuming that the poor, the ill-
housed, and other targets of entitlement subsidy programs in boom-
towns should receive government aid or be denied it just as though
they lived in New York or Kalamazoo. Our concern is to identify
people who deserve compensation for specifically boomtown-related
injury. Conversely, if property falls $5,000 in value because a strip
mine spoils the view, the owner should not be found less deserving of
$5,000 in compensation just because he is richer or healthier than
another who suffers an equivalent loss.
A. Compensation Criteria
To determine who is and is not deserving of compensation, a test of
injury will be applied to the various boomtown populations disag-
gregated in the previous section. The test is a simple one applied to the
change in opportunities, including those not chosen, individuals expe-
rience with the occurrence of boomtown development. We argue that
an individual is better off if he has more options (residential locations,
jobs, friends, lifestyles) to choose from, and worse off if some are
foreclosed. A Paretian criterion 51 can be formulated more precisely:
51. According to the Pareto criterion, State A is better than State B if someone is
better off in State A and no one is worse off. The Pareto optimal state would be that
state for which no other state can be considered better by the Pareto criterion. See
Zeckhauser and Schaefer, supra note 47, at 43.
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A state of affairs S2 is preferable to S in the view of an individual
if it offers him more choices, but does not foreclose any that S1
provided.
If a state of affairs provides new choices but eliminates others, this
criterion will not help us. But an "independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives" 52 corollary can be stated:
If a state of affairs S4 offers an individual a choice which state S3
forecloses, S4 is preferable to S3 in the individual's view if he did
not choose any of the foreclosed options under S3 and chooses one
of the new options under S4.
For example, if we are prohibited from sleeping under bridges by a
proposed ordinance which also prohibits stealing bread, we will favor
the ordinance since it allows us the new, desirable option of keeping
our bread but forecloses an option we don't take advantage of anyway.
Figure 3 illustrates the above criteria with the symbolism of decision
analysis. The utilities of the choices in each state of affairs are defined
ordinally such that the choice made by the individual is exactly the
choice with the highest utility. The variables A, B, C and D have
positive values, and they or their combinations represent the amount
of the utility of each choice. By our first criterion, State 2 is preferred
to State 1, as it offers an additional option without foreclosing any
options previously available. By our second criterion, State 4 is pre-
ferred to State 3. The only option lost, valued at A-B, would not have
been chosen in State 3. The new option made available in State 4,
valued at A+D, is preferable to the choice with utility A, found in both
states.
Not all circumstances can be compared by these rules; if my favorite
television program is replaced by another that I choose to watch, it's
not clear whether I am better or worse off. Nor will these criteria help
us determine the amount of compensation appropriate for a deserving
individual unless a scheme is developed in which the victims can
display meaningful exchange behavior. 53 But they can be applied to the
populations discussed in Part I to rule out compensation for some of
them. If someone's post-boom circumstances are no worse than his
pre-boom condition by our criteria, there is nothing for which to
compensate him.
52. R. LUCE AND H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 127 (1967).
53. Such a scheme is applied to the siting decision, and its importance is discussed, in
O'Hare, "Not on My Block You Don't"--Facilities Siting and the Strategic Importance
of Compensation, 25 PUBLIC POLICY 407 (1977).
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Figure 3
Choice Criteria
Utility
A
S 0 A-B S2
(2 is preferred to 1)
A
A-B
(4 is preferre
S4
dto K3)
A, B, C, D, - 0
B. Compensation in the Boomtown
The change in state that the boomtown development brings to the
original residents of the community is illustrated in Figure 4a. Before
energy development is threatened or occurs, individuals face two basic
options. Those who are present have most recently chosen option 1,
whether implicitly or consciously. Development adds a new option.
They can live in the boomtown, enjoying or suffering (according to
their taste and fortune) financial changes and changes in the quality of
life. However, the development forecloses option 1. They can no
longer choose the original town with its unmovable and unique friend-
ship patterns, landscape and traditions.
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Figure 4
Boomtown Residents' Choices
Before Boom
I Rural life
B2Move Away
Out Mi
A Rural life
B 2 Move away
Nonmig
After Boom
WAn2' Move away'
Boomtown lifegrant
rAt2'Move away'
, n Boomtown life
(a) Original Residents
Present life
B 2 Possible
change E
Present life
Possible
change
Move
to boomtown
(b) Immigrants
Option
Chosen option
Among outmigrants, individuals who leave town because of the
development, the pre-boom state of affairs is preferred according to
our second criterion. Notice that B, "before," includes an option that
A, "after," does not, and the individual chooses that option under B.
0(0
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Also, the option which A offers that B does not is not the one he
chooses under A. This means at least to a first approximation that the
boomtown has imposed costs on the individual by forcing him into a
less preferred set of choices. We say first approximation because as
the primes in Figure 4a indicate, moving out of a boomtown may be
quite different from moving out of the original town. For example, the
boom development may have increased land values so that the emig-
rant can sell his property for an amount of money so large that he
would have sold at that price and left had the option been available
under B. If we think this to be true, though it is presumably not the
case for renters or small property holders, then we cannot be confident
that the boomtown has injured the individual, though we can no more
be sure that he has gained.
A similar argument applies to an individual who remains after the
changes brought by development. Since the boomtown has offered him
a new option, which he accepts, and foreclosed the one he chose under
the old state of affairs, his condition may be improved, damaged, or
indifferent after development.
The immigrant who arrives to do construction work or to enter
secondary sectors such as retailing, after a town starts to boom,
displays different sets of choices as shown in Figure 4b. Before the
development occurs, he chooses between his present life and whatever
other options are available to him. After the development, all these
options remain but a third option is added. Furthermore, each immi-
grant has chosen option 3. By our first criterion the boomtown has
improved his condition.
The analysis in the paragraphs above indicates the importance of
distinguishing the populations of a boomtown. Some of the original
residents of the community may be damaged by the development in a
way that justifies subsidy, though others may be advantaged by the
development or indifferent to it. But the newcomers often claimed to
suffer social costs from boomtown life are not plausible candidates for
subsidy through any boomtown-related program.5 4
This distinction has its roots in a fundamental difference between
the "move-in" decision and other decisions, as noted in the last col-
umn of Figure 2 above. Most of the decisions, whether made by a
group or an "individual" (for example, the developer), affect all of
54. Again, they may deserve government aid for a variety of reasons, but if so it will
be under programs directed at people sharing their conditions generally and not only
those who have such needs in boomtowns.
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those involved in the same way: either everyone in town loses his
"rural life" option (Figure 4a) or no one does. The "move-in" deci-
sion, on the other hand, is made by each potential immigrant. The
quality of the boomtown is little affected by any of their individual
decisions and they do not have to suffer its effects collectively. These
individual decisions as to participation in the boomtown insulate immi-
grants from suffering the bad consequences of the decisions of others.
No collective decision on the part of the townspeople can protect each
townsperson in the same way.
C. Disaggregation of Affected Populations
Polices to ameliorate conditions in boomtowns, to the extent that
they involve money transfers to their populations, should recognize
the distinctions we have drawn in the section above. In particular,
"boom-town-specific" impact compensation is clearly not appropriate
for the immigrants. They should be regarded as candidates for assist-
ance on the same basis as other groups in the state and national
population, and the conventional rules for justifying aid should be
applied.55 To anyone familiar, even at second hand, with the conditions
in some boomtowns, this conclusion may seem harsh. Some qualifying
observations are in order, though the basic result is not diminished.
Certainly, the analysis provided above is weakened if the immigrants
55. Note, however, that boomtown workers may fare poorly in the competition for
direct assistance dollars from any level of government, since their incomes are large and
low income has traditionally been a necessary condition for general assistance programs
from government. Migrant farm workers, slum dwellers and some minority groups will
probably be found in greater need. Furthermore, boomtown immigrants obviously prefer
their boomtown condition to their previous circumstance. If they were not found worthy
of assistance before, it is hard to see why they should suddenly become eligible.
Our lumping together all immigrants and declaring them ineligible for compensation
may appear too simple. Consider immigrants who follow energy booms, staying in one
location until work runs out. The boom/bust cycle associated with energy development
"causes" the cessation of work in one location, and these people may appear to have
only one choice other than unemployment, Le., moving on to the next boomtown. By
our criteria, these people may deserve compensation from the previous energy boom,
but not from one they have just joined. If one were to consider the costs and benefits
from all of their moves, however, they probably would still show a net benefit. In
deciding their first move to an energy boomtown (i.e., the decision to adopt a career that
requires such mobility) they probably knew the job would be temporary and they would
have to move within a few years. The cost they placed on their eventual move was
included in their personal calculation of the costs and benefits associated with this option
and the boomtown lifestyle. One survey comparing newcomers and oldtimers in a coal
boomtown shows that newcomers tend to be younger, more mobile, better educated, and
significantly better paid. Many newcomers know their positions are temporary and
expect to move when the coal is depleted. Even prior to their most recent move, the
newcomers tended to be a highly mobile population. See Nellis, supra note 23, at 232-33.
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don't know what they are getting into. We have no way to assess the
extent of this problem, but our rejection of subsidy programs for these
people is accompanied by endorsement of "fair recruiting" practices
and, if necessary, regulations, to ensure that immigrants know what
conditions they can expect.
Furthermore, life in the boomtown may be suboptimal for structural
reasons that can only be overcome by collective action beyond the
abilities of a suddenly expanded, inexperienced local government. We
expect public goods such as police protection and street maintenance
to be under-provided by the market.56 We should similarly expect that
a government forced to operate beyond its capacities will not provide
them optimally. Confidence that boomtown residents would happily
pay for better government services, but cannot obtain them for ad-
ministrative reasons, would support intervention by a higher and rela-
tively less overstrained level of government to provide such services.
This kind of assistance is not intrinsically a subsidy program, since the
administrative services might be paid for through local assessments,
but when local planning assistance is provided most efficiently by
simply giving it away, our argument would not discourage it.57
As we have seen,58 the original residents of a booming town cannot
be excluded on equity grounds from development-related compensa-
56. See generally W. NICHOLSON, MICROECONoMIc THEORY, ch. 23 (1972).
57. This said, we should note a consideration that challenges all attempts to amelior-
ate the conditions of boomtown life. As reports from the Alaska pipeline project relate,
the well-paid work on the "slope" and to some extent, in any boomtown, offers an
opportunity for capital accumulation not otherwise available in American society. See
W. Griffith, Blood, Toil, Tears and Oil: Effects of the Alaskan Pipeline, N.Y. Times,
July 27, 1975, (Magazine), at 8. There are risks (lotteries and investment) which offer
(actuarially unfair) low probabilities of very high returns, but few chances exist for a
working man to accumulate enough capital with certainty to start a business or otherwise
change what used to be called his "station." The boomtown allows those who wish to
trade two or three years of suffering for large rewards to do so, but if boomtown
conditions are made more attractive the wages associated with them can be expected to
decline to match wages in established communities. Several researchers are developing
the premise that wage differentials between boomtowns and stable communities are
considered a premium to compensate workers for the boomtown's poor quality of life.
Preliminary findings suggest a $.04 per week salary premium for each dollar decrease in
per capita public capital stock. See Cummings and Mehr, Investments for Urban Infras-
tructure in Boomtowns, 17 NAT. RESOURCES J. 223 (1977). It is not obvious that boom-
town workers using current conditions as a means to step over a convexity in their
utility-of-money curve would consider it a favor to have the option to do so foreclosed.
See H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS 94-97 (1968). In fact, we should at least entertain the
possibility that boomtowns where life is onerous, but pay is high, serve a social purpose
analogous to the function of the frontier in Turner's interpretation, and that this purpose
might not only mitigate the societal cost of boomtown pathologies but even justify them!
See F. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1920).
58. See Figure 4(a) and accompanying text supra.
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tion. Some may profit from the change, but some will suffer, and the
relative size of the two groups is difficult to ascertain, especially
before the development occurs. While most people who stay after
development may receive economic benefits such as new or better
jobs, increased retail business, or land value appreciation, the unpriced
social costs that are packaged indivisibly with the economic gains
could well outweigh them. Furthermore, special costs are visited on
particular subpopulations.
Despite the complexity of this packaging, costs and benefits can be
identified with particular categories of people. People often face in-
creased costs because they suffer inflated cost of living and reduced
service quality without increases in income, wealth or the quality of
new services. The examples below portray some categories of people
likely to deserve compensation.
1. People on fixed incomes: Most retirees and handicapped people
depend on a fixed income. Many female-headed households draw a
large share of their income from welfare payments. If the local cost of
living increases, these people suffer financially and therefore experi-
ence a declining quality of life.59
2. Workers in surplus-labor categories: Workers in occupations for
which there are a surplus of workers will not participate in the wage
inflation felt in other occupations for which there is a shortage of
workers. 60 Thus, real incomes of the former workers will decrease as
the cost of living increases while their salaries remain constant. In
particular, working women are seldom allowed to enter the high-paying
construction field. Inflation, higher rents and a declining quality of life
also hurt them when an influx of construction workers' wives may
create a downward pressure on the wages and benefits paid for tradi-
tionally female-occupied service sector jobs.61
59. Limited empirical evidence shows that the income of aged residents in industri-
alizing rural communities decreases relative to non-aged residents in the same communi-
ty and to both aged and non-aged residents in stable rural communities. See Clemente
and Summers, Industrial Development and the Elderly: A Longitudinal Analysis, 28 J.
GERONTOLOGY 479 (1973).
60. For example, the city manager in Mt. Pleasant, Texas, a coal boomtown, esti-
mates that 20% of the city's population will face an increased cost of living without
experiencing any increase in income and wealth. Within this 20% he includes unskilled
laborers facing no increased demand for their labor. See D. Sanderson, supra note 14, at
11-27.
61. Clemente and Summers discuss the relative benefits received by women in
rapidly growing rural communities. See F. Clemente and G. Summers, Large Industries
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3. Farm laborers: In cases of extensive strip-mining, agricultural
laborers may lose their jobs and those leasing farms may lose not only
their farms but also their homes.
4. Owners of agricultural-related industries: Increased energy de-
velopment has meant locally decreased agricultural production. Indus-
tries dependent on local produce may suffer decreased revenues or
even go bankrupt. For example, in southwest Texas, planned construc-
tion of a food processing plant was delayed because area farmers could
no longer sign contracts guaranteeing the needed supply of produce.62
5. Consumers of particular services: The decreased quality of serv-
ices consumed by all residents-such as roads, police protection and
fire protection-creates costs for everyone, but other services impose
costs directly on selected groups of residents. For example, school
children suffer more than adults from overcrowded schools, the elder-
ly from overcrowded health facilities and overburdened doctors.
Not everyone within these categories automatically deserves com-
pensation, since they may also be in categories of people who benefit.
Property owners usually gain from increased property values, and
owners of commercial establishments gain additional profits from in-
creased business. Workers in occupations facing worker shortages-
skilled labor, middle and upper managers-benefit from increased
wages and job opportunities. Some unemployed people may find work
which pays more than unemployment compensation. In cases where
significant portions of land have not been disturbed, a shortage of
agricultural laborers may increase salaries. And residents who learn to
prefer an increased variety of social interaction may consider crowding
and the arrival of newcomers as a benefit rather than a cost.
Despite these special cases, the conclusion of this analysis can be
simply put: the only residents of a boomtown who should be sub-
sidized or compensated under a boomtown program are found among
the original residents. This has important policy implications for the
conventional panoply of boomtown aid programs sketched in Section
I.
III. COMPENSATION ALTERNATIVES
In light of the foregoing analysis, aid programs which direct funds to
the government of boomtowns, especially after development has be-
in Small Towns: Who Benefits? 7-8 (1973) (Working Paper RID 73.9, Center for Applied
Sociology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin).
62. D. Sanderson, supra note 14, at 11-23.
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gun, can be seen to suffer from a fundamental flaw. By confusing a
town with the people who live in it, this legislation generally directs aid
to a population that includes a preponderance of recipients who ought
not to be served: immigrants. Alternatively, the programs might be
looked at as entitlement subsidy programs, directed towards people
who are, for whatever reasons, deserving of amelioration by pay-
ments. In this view they are absurdly narrow, excluding all the people
who qualify on grounds of their condition but happen not to live in
boomtowns. In this section we will propose a conceptual framework
that seems suitable for the design of "boomtown impact programs"
and will also show that whatever compensation is paid should go to
individuals rather than to local governments.
A. Boomtowns as Disasters
Nearly all of us willingly insure ourselves, paying a small, certain
premium, against large, unlikely losses of various kinds. In some
cases, rather than instituting an explicit voluntary insurance program,
we agree to tax ourselves for relief payments to be disbursed whenever
some of us suffer natural calamities like floods, earthquakes, or hur-
ricanes. 63 If we accept that, on grounds of national interest which
dominate any local costs, natural resources will be developed even
though suffering is caused to those who live near them, the occurrence
of a boomtown can be viewed as a natural disaster deserving compen-
sation as "insurance."
To make this analogy clearer, consider two rural communities en-
gaged in agricultural pursuits. One is struck by a devastating tornado,
while the ground beneath the other suddenly turns to coal. Mining of
the coal, and its consequent boomtown effects, are inevitable from the
town's point of view. Both towns are similarly affected by natural
forces beyond their control; the difference between the tornado and
boomtown cases, if any, lies in the possibility that the coal-affected
town has more warning that its coal will become economically attrac-
tive. But even this distinction is a weak one, since most natural disas-
ters are foreshadowed probabilistically-floods occur in flood plains,
tornadoes in tornado belts, and earthquakes in seismic zones.
Granting that state regulation and energy developers have some
opportunity to divert the energy boomtown "disaster" from one coal
field to another, at least in the short-run, we suggest that an energy
63. For a general discussion of federal programs compensating communities for
disasters and government action, see S. Brody, supra note 36.
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boomtown "happening to a community" is analogous for public policy
purposes to a natural disaster, and that the insurance model justifies
payment of compensation to the sufferers. Such payment should be
made with care, and the allocation will inevitably be imperfect," but
the only important qualification boomtowns impose on the disaster
relief model follows from the fact that energy development is benefi-
cial to identifiable parties, the consumers and the developer. There-
fore, the "premiums" for insurance should probably be collected from
them, for example by an excise tax which forces the price of the
developer's product up, for reasons of efficiency noted in Section 1.65
We have taken pains to defend the disaster insurance model because
it points out the narrowness of the impact of boomtown development
in a way complementary to the analysis in Section II. Just as tornadoes
don't happen to people who arrive after they occur, the compensable
costs of a boomtown are not imposed on immigrants. Similarly, we
note, in anticipation of the argument below, that disasters do not
happen to governments, but to individuals, and correctly designed
disaster relief programs provide subsidized loans, or grants-in-aid, to
the individuals and not to their governments' treasuries. 66
B. Individual Compensation versus Intergovernmental Transfers
The boomtown disaster is visited, whatever its intensity, uniquely on
a town's original residents, including those who find new conditions so
distasteful that they leave. In order to direct compensation towards its
proper objects, it is important that it not be provided directly to the
community's government. There are several reasons why we prefer
compensation payments directly to individuals.
1. Spatial mismatch-Many people who suffer from a boomtown
do not live in the jurisdiction of the government in which the devel-
opment "mostly" occurs. There are people on unincorporated land
within "impact distance" of rural energy developments. Similarly,
larger units of government are likely to include many individuals who
are not affected adversely, but who would benefit from an intergovern-
mental transfer. It is rare that the constituents of any local government
are the same group as the persons affected in a boom.
64. E.g., the town carpenter may be given relief payment for his house after a
tornado even though the destruction it wreaks on his neighbors is a bonanza for him.
65. See notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra.
66. However, many existing programs ignore this precept. See S. Brody, supra note
36.
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2. Temporal mismatch-Few governments can usefully spend a
large windfall so as to dispense the benefits of the expenditure very
quickly. Furthermore, many of the perceived needs of a rapidly grow-
ing community involve capital expenditures like school buildings. If
the local government uses compensation receipts in ways which pro-
duce benefits over time, the newcomers, who we have demonstrated
should be excluded from such benefits, will inevitably participate in
the services delivered. Unless these benefits are wholly public goods,
this participation will be at the expense of the original residents who
were the intended beneficiaries of the whole amount of the subsidy.
Not only will the newcomers passively draw off an unwarranted share
of these benefits, but since they can be expected to exert significant
and possibly dominating influence in the conduct of government after
development occurs, they will presumably turn capital investments
they inherit towards the particular types of benefits that they prefer
and which are unlikely to match the desires of the oldtimers. 67
3. Poor discrimination-Few government services are purely pub-
lic goods, but most have the non-excludability property at least in
part.' Local government's attempts to distribute the benefits of com-
pensation receipts are unlikely to make the allocation of benefits match
the differential costs suffered by citizens. If it hires more police, crime
will be reduced for everyone, including those who actually benefited
from the boom; if it reduces taxes, it will reduce them for everyone. If
the "spill-over" benefits are obtained as a free bonus from a govern-
ment program which adequately compensates the real losers, well and
good, but there is nothing in our understanding of the kinds of costs
boom developments impose to suggest that improved government
services are an especially apt compensation for those costs. Further-
more, an important class of sufferers, those who leave as a conse-
quence of the boom and take their votes with them, have only the most
tenuous claim on local government's sympathies.
4. Flexibility-We find conclusive the fact that while compensa-
tion paid to government is likely to miss its intended targets for reasons
1 to 3 above, compensation to individuals does not inhibit the provision
of government services as compensation when the sufferers find that
67. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
68. The classic example is a park, A's enjoyment of which, until congestion sets in,
leaves no less for B. The correct admission fee (price) for such goods is the marginal cost
of providing them, or zero, so compensating A with a park inevitably benefits B as well.
E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS 424-26 (1970).
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appropriate. If they feel that government can best spend all or part of
their payments, they can tax themselves and give the responsibility to
government. They can even provide benefits to the newcomers
through capital investment, if they so desire. Thus, individual compen-
sation assures that the money so paid will go wherever it best serves
the interests of the payees, even to government, where as compensa-
tion paid to government gives no such assurance.
We excused ourselves from detailed consideration of allocating
compensation payments among individuals, but a general observation
can be made. Such allocation should be done through entitlement rules
constructed in general terms, and not in view of any particular boom-
town's history. It is preferable to construct a schedule of "boomtown
disaster relief" under which individuals qualify for fixed payments
insofar as they meet specific qualifications like "retired person,"
"non-landowner" or "agricultural supplies retailer." These categories
of gainers and losers discussed in the previous section69 are not exclu-
sive and any compensation scheme designed to identify net costs must
consider the magnitude of gains and losses for each category, 70 balanc-
ing expected costs and benefits in order to determine an individual's
eligibility for compensation.
The size of the compensation should also be included in the compen-
sation schedule and should cover real dollar costs, environmental
costs, aesthetic costs and social costs predicted, at the time of the
boom, to be imposed by energy development. Future unexpected
benefits should not mean compensees must repay the compensation.
The compensation should not be made in view of the residents' subse-
quent good or bad experience during the boom itself. The compensa-
tion is for suffering, current and predicted, which is imposed at the
time the boom becomes a certainty, and any subsequent advantage a
citizen gains from the development is appropriately considered his
own. It is entirely appropriate for a boomtown resident to take his
compensation and build a fortune as a shovel merchant. Similarly, the
farmer who loses his compensation through unwise investment may
qualify for income transfers paid to poor people statewide or national-
ly, but the misfortune is not a boom-related one.
69. See notes 58-62 and accompanying text supra.
70. For example, a person on a fixed income may own his own home. Increased
benefits from home ownership may not be sufficient to cover increased costs-food,
clothes, taxes, medical services. This home owner may be eligible for compensation
whereas a salaried home owner may not. Although home owners generally benefit from
increased property values, those living near a facility or residential roads which become
thoroughfares may face decreased property value.
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CONCLUSION
Design of an appropriate boomtown compensation program in light
of our analysis inevitably requires detailed consideration of gains and
losses like those sketched above, 71 an analysis that will require empir-
ical research not yet performed. The program's specific characteristics
should depend on a balance between the costs of missing deserving
parties, or wasting resources on undeserving people who slip through
the net on the one hand, and the cost of research and administration on
the other. What is important about the design process is that it begin
with a theoretically valid framework limiting the search to correctly
specified groups of potential recipients, and that it be focussed on
individuals and not geographical or government units. As we have
seen, unless the analysis starts with individuals and moves towards
geographical or governmental aggregation only when efficiency de-
mands it, it is likely to miss entirely important distinctions among the
people the aid program intends to serve.
Our narrow conclusion, then, is that boomtown compensation pro-
grams should be focussed as finely as seems worthwhile on certain
members of the original resident population, and should not be direct-
ed to residents of post-development boomtowns nor through'local
governments. Our broad conclusion is that the shorthand by which we
refer to the people in a place by the place's name, or even worse,
confuse them with their local government, is a trap for the unwary and
one that can lead to major errors in policy design. It would be a wise
humility for analysts to go back to first principles, repeatedly murmur-
ing if necessary, mantras like
Cities don't suffer, people do.
A government is not a polity and a polity is not a person.
How would I feel if they did it to me?
71. See notes 58-62 and accompanying text supra.
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